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Abstract. The e¤ects of entry on consumer and total welfare are studied in a model
of consumer search. Potential entrants di¤er in quality, with high-quality sellers being
more likely to meet consumer needs. Contrary to the standard view in economics that more
entry benets consumers, we nd that consumer welfare has an inverted-U relationship with
entry cost, and free entry is excessive for both consumer and total welfare when entry cost
is relatively low. We explain why these results may arise naturally in search markets due to
the variety and quality e¤ects of entry, and discuss their business and policy implications.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Entry is of central importance to competition and market performance. While it has long
been known that free entry is e¢ cient under perfect competition, economists have more
recently recognized that, when rms possess market power, unencumbered entry generally
has ambiguous e¤ects on total welfare, because an entrant internalizes neither the consumer
gain nor a rivals loss (e.g., Von Weizsack, 1980; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; and Cabral,
2004). The standard view in economics, however, is still that more entry will boost consumer
welfare. In homogeneous-product industries, industry output under Cournot competition
generally expands with entry (e.g., Seade, 1980).1 Even in markets with di¤erentiated
products, where it has been argued that price-increasing entry is theoretically unexceptional,
the consumer gain from greater product variety will usually dominate any potential adverse
price e¤ect (e.g., Chen and Riordan, 2008).
This paper conducts a new analysis of entry and welfare in an important class of markets
those with consumer search, focusing especially on how entry a¤ects consumer welfare, mea-
sured by aggregate consumer surplus. Our interest in search markets is partly motivated
by the reection that, despite the substantial progress in the economics of search,2 little
attention has been paid to the e¤ects of changes in entry conditions, and yet technological
progress such as the Internet has drastically reduced entry costs in many search markets.
We focus on consumer welfare because, as we shall demonstrate, the common belief that
unfettered entry benets consumers is actually misguided. This will have important ram-
ications for business practices as well as for antitrust and regulation policies that aim to
increase consumer welfare.
1However, an important counter-intuitivending is provided by Amir and Lambson (2000), who demon-
strate that price can increase in the number of rms under Cournot competition. Nevertheless, as they point
out, the assumptions needed for such an outcome, which involves an unstable equilibrium in a certain sense,
are restrictive.
2Starting from the seminal work of Stigler (1961), the literature has advanced in the directions of search
for the best price among competing homogeneous sellers (e.g., Stahl, 1989) and of search for the best value
among competing di¤erentiated sellers (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986).
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We consider a market with N potential entrants who di¤er in quality the probability
that a seller will meet each consumers need. For example, a bookstore carrying more titles
has a higher probability to have the book that a consumer is looking for; a travel company
o¤ering more tour packages is more likely to have a product that the consumer desires. One
may also think that the consumer has some specic requirement for a product, such as a
certain design feature for a home-improvement project or a tight deadline for the projects
completion, and a high-quality rm is more likely to have the ability to meet the consumers
need. It could also be that the consumers are input purchasers on an intermediate-good
market, and a high-quality supplier is more likely to meet each buyers quality standard for
the input.
Each consumer has unit demand. A consumers utility from purchasing a non-matched
product is normalized to zero. Her utility from a matched sellers product, u; is a random
draw from a known distribution, non-negative, and identical for all the consumers matches.3
Each potential entrants match probability is its private information, and the entry cost for
each entrant is k: Potential entrants rst simultaneously choose whether to enter the market
by incurring the entry cost, each making the decision based on the realization of its type (i.e.,
its match probability), after which all sellers in the market simultaneously choose prices.
The entry and price decisions are deterministic (i.e., they are pure strategies). The model is
thus a dynamic game of incomplete information, and the type-contingent nature of the entry
decision makes the model di¤erent from an otherwise standard two-stage entry game (e.g.,
Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Notice that, ex ante, potential sellers are di¤erentiated
both vertically and horizontally. A high-quality seller, with a high match probability, is
more desirable for all consumers.4 However, all matched sellers of a consumer are ex post
homogeneous.
3Thus, a consumers values for all her matched sellers are perfectly dependent. This formulation, which
wil play an important role in simplifying our analysis, follows several recent papers on consumer search,
including Athey and Ellison (2011), Chen and He (2011), and Eliaz and Spiegler (2011).
4 If all potential sellers had the same match probability, they would di¤er only horizontally, in the sense
that while each sellers product is di¤erentiated due to its random utility, it has the same expected value to
every consumer.
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This model has a unique symmetric (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium under free entry, where
any potential entrant will choose to enter the market if and only if its match probability
exceeds a threshold, tf ; whereas the equilibrium market price, following Diamond (1971),
is invariant to the number of actual entrants, n  1: At this equilibrium, a natural measure
of entry is the expected number of entrants, which is a decreasing function of tf ; and tf
in turn is an increasing function of entry cost k; the exogenous parameter: A reduction in
tf ; or an increase in entry, expands the search options available to each consumer, but also
reduces the expected quality of sellers in the market and makes it less likely for a search
to produce a match. In other words, entry a¤ects consumers through both a variety and a
quality e¤ect. It turns out that the interaction of these two e¤ects causes consumer welfare
to vary non-monotonically with tf ; and hence also with k. Consequently, consumer welfare
is an inverted-U function of entry cost, rst increasing and then decreasing, maximized at
some critical k; for which the corresponding entry threshold is t: Moreover, when k < k;
free entry leads to excessive numbers of rms for both consumer and total welfare, because
k < k implies tf < t and hence excessive entry for consumer welfare, which further implies
excessive entry for total welfare due to the business-stealing e¤ect of the marginal entrant.
On the other hand, when k > k; entry is decient for consumer welfare and, as we shall
further show, also for total welfare for su¢ ciently large k.
Our result on how entry a¤ects consumer welfare, while unconventional, is quite natural
for search markets, with the following intuition: when k (or tf ) is high, the expected
number of entrants is small but the marginal entrants quality is high, and hence for a
marginal decrease in k (or tf ); the positive variety e¤ect outweighs the negative quality
e¤ect: Conversely, when k is low, a large number of rms enter but the marginal entrants
quality is low, and hence for a marginal increase in k; the positive quality e¤ect dominates
the negative variety e¤ect:5
5With the variety and quality e¤ects separated from any potential price e¤ect, it is clear that the possible
consumer loss from entry in our analysis comes from a new source, di¤erent from what is known in the
literature price increase. In search markets, more sellers can cause price either to rise (e.g., Satterthwaite,
1979; Stahl, 1989) or to fall (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986). Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) also show that
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To investigate the robustness of our results and to gain additional insights, we further
study a variant of the main model, in which a consumers value for each match is an
independent random draw. The matched sellers of any consumer are then horizontally
di¤erentiated, as in Wolinsky (1986);6 and everything else is the same as in the main
model. In addition to the variety and quality e¤ects, entry then also has a price e¤ect,
as equilibrium price now varies with the number of sellers in the market.7 A nding here,
possibly of independent interest, is that equilibrium market price decreases in the expected
quality of sellers in the market. The e¤ect of entry on consumer welfare is more complicated
in this setting, due to the additional price e¤ect. For the numerical examples we have
considered, nevertheless, consumer welfare remains an inverted-U function of entry cost,
and the excessive or decient entry results under free entry also continue to hold.
In search markets, therefore, it will not be unusual for entry restrictions to benet con-
sumers. This can shed light on many business practices. Consider, for instance, the market
of apps for iphones and ipads. Apple clearly has the incentive to increase consumer surplus
in this market, which would boost its prots from the sale of iphones and ipads. Whereas
more entrants of app developers will o¤er users more product varieties, the entry of low
quality sellers can reduce search e¢ ciency and make it harder for consumers to nd a de-
sired app. Apple appears to balance this trade o¤ by creating substantial entry barriers:
it charges a xed fee to each entrant ($99/year), and the entrants product needs to go
through a stringent review process. Only after the product is approved by Apple can it be
o¤ered for sale to consumers. In addition to entry barriers created by private entities (as we
shall discuss further in the concluding section), government policies can also limit entry. A
the expected price can increase, decrease, or unchange with more rms. Our model thus provides a useful
baseline case.
6Search models with horizontally di¤erentiated sellers following Wolinsky (1986) include, for example,
Anderson and Renault (1999), Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009), Hann and Moraga-González (2011),
and Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat, 2012).
7 If the value of a consumers matched seller is low, the consumer will now have the incentive to search
more, to possibly nd another match with a higher value. As a result, the market price will depend on the
number of sellers.
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minimum quality requirement, for example, can positively impact both consumer and total
welfare by raising the quality of the marginal entrant. A license fee that acts as a transfer
payment, which may be easier to implement, can have the same benecial e¤ects. On the
other hand, an entry barrier that adds to physical cost of entry (such as transaction cost)
might benet consumers but reduce total welfare.
In the rest of the paper, we describe our model in Section 2, and characterize its equi-
librium in Section 3. In Section 4, we study how the equilibrium (expected) number of
entrants, or entry cost, a¤ects consumer and total welfare, and we also compare the free
entry outcomes with those maximizing consumer welfare or total welfare. After analyzing
the variant of the main model in Section 5, we conclude in Section 6.
2. THE MODEL
The market contains a unit mass of consumers, each demanding one unit of a product.
There are N  2 potential entrants who can choose to become active sellers, and the
entry cost for each seller is k > 0: The production cost of each seller is normalized to
zero. Each consumer is ex ante uncertain about whether a particular rm o¤ers a product
that she desires and how much she is willing to pay for such a product. Specically, with
probability i; potential entrant is product, i = 1; 2; :::N; meets a consumers need. The
consumer derives utility u from consuming the product of all her matched sellers; and u is an
independent draw from distribution F with density f on support [u; u] ; where u > u  0:
With probability 1   i; is product does not meet the consumers need, in which case
the consumer utility from the product is normalized to zero. Thus, we consider i as a
measure of i0s quality.8 Potential sellers di¤er in their likelihood to meet a consumers
need. In particular, we assume that i draws from cumulative distribution function G with
density function g > 0 on support [0; 1] : Our formulation is a tractable way of modeling
the idea that rms di¤er both vertically and horizontally, with a higher i corresponding
8 In fact, the expected value of seller i0s product to a consumer is simply i
R u
u
udF (u) ; which increases
in i:
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to a higher quality, and rms would only di¤er horizontally if all i were identical. (Recall
some motivating examples for this model discussed in Section 1.)
The timing of the model is as follows. First, i is realized and is known privately by i:
Second, potential entrants simultaneously choose either to enter the market or to stay out.
Third, the market structure is determined, with n entrants as sellers. Although n = 0 is
always a possibility, our analysis will focus on situations where n  1; and we assume that
k is relatively small so that a potential entrant with a su¢ ciently high i will enter the
market: Fourth, sellers simultaneously and independently set their prices, after which each
consumer, without knowing whether any particular seller is a match, her value u if there
is a match; and the sellers price, chooses whether and how to conduct sequential search.
Each search will enable the consumer to discover the aforementioned information from a
seller, with search cost s. We study symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game.
Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that G and F satisfy the monotonic
hazard-rate condition:
d

g()
1 G()

d
 0;
d

f(u)
1 F (u)

du
 0: (1)
Let
po = arg max
p
fp [1  F (p)]g ; o = po [1  F (po)] :
Then, from (1), po uniquely exists. Condition (1) will play important roles both in the main
model and in its variant.
3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Suppose for a moment that, given k; a potential entrant will enter the market if and only
if its quality exceeds some threshold t:We rst study equilibrium for any given threshold t:
We then show that in equilibrium the expected prot of potential entrant i indeed increases
in i; thereby conrming the optimality of the threshold-based entry strategy for each
potential entrant. The equilibrium threshold tf is then determined, which is shown to
increase in k.
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For any given t; the expected match probability of an entrant is
   (t) =
R 1
t xg (x) dx
1 G (t) ; (2)
where  > t for all t 2 [0; 1) since R 1t xg (x) dx > t [1 G (t)] :
First, consider the sellersprice strategy and consumerssearch strategy. If there is only
one seller (n = 1), its equilibrium price will be po; and consumers will search if

Z u
po
(u  po) f (u) du  s  0: (3)
Condition (3) is satised if s is not too large, which we assume throughout the paper.
With n  2 sellers, from standard arguments (e.g., Diamond, 1971; Chen and He, 2011),
there is a unique equilibrium where each seller sets p = po; each consumer will search
sequentially and will purchase from the rst match, provided that u  po: The consumer
will exit the market without purchase if u < po or if she has searched all n sellers without
nding a match.
Thus, in equilibrium, seller i0s expected prot for any given t is
n (i) = i
on; (4)
where
n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
(1  )j = 1  (1  )
n
n
(5)
is the number of consumers who come to seller i for the rst time after sampling j 2
f0; 1; :::; n  1g other sellers.
We next determine the endogenous number of sellers: Consider a potential sellers entry
decision. From (4), a sellers expected prot, when there are n entrants, is increasing in
i: To determine the equilibrium t; we consider the decision of i with i: The post-entry
expected prot for i is
E (ji) =
NX
n=1
n (t)n (i) ; (6)
where
n (t) =

N 1
n 1

[1 G (t)]n 1G (t)N n (7)
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is the probability that n   1 other potential entrants enter and n (i) is the expected
prot for i if it chooses entry simultaneously as the n   1 others. Our analysis will utilize
the following preliminary result, which states that (i) an increase in the marginal entrants
quality will raise the average quality of all entrants in the market, but (ii) the marginal
increases relatively more than the average. The proof for (i) is straightforward, and while
(ii) is also intuitive, its proof utilizes the hazard-rate condition (1).
Lemma 1 For all t 2 [0; 1):
(i)
d
dt
=
g (t)
1 G (t) (   t) > 0; (ii)
d (t= (t))
dt
=
   g(t)t( t)1 G(t)
2
> 0: (8)
Proof. (i) From (2), for all t 2 [0; 1);
d
dt
=
 tg (t) [1 G (t)] + g (t) R 1t xg (x) dx
[1 G (t)]2 =
g (t)
1 G (t) (   t) > 0:
(ii) Since
d (t=)
dt
=
1
2

   td
dt

=
1
2

   g (t) t (   t)
1 G (t)

=
 (t)
2
; (9)
where  (t)    g(t)t( t)1 G(t) ; to prove d(t=(t))dt > 0; it su¢ ces to show  (t) > 0 for all t 2 [0; 1):
Notice that  (0) =  > 0: Also, since
lim
t!1
d
dt
= lim
t!1
g (t) (   t)
1 G (t) = g (1) limt!1
(   t)
1 G (t) = g (1)
limt!1 ddt   1
  limt!1 g (t) = 1  limt!1
d
dt
;
we have limt!1 ddt =
1
2 : It follows that
lim
t!1
 (t) = 1  g (1) limt!1
d
dt   1
 g (1) =
1
2
:
Now, suppose to the contrary that  (t)  0 for some t 2 (0; 1) : Then there must exist at
least one t^ 2 (0; 1) such that   t^ = 0 and 0  t^ > 0: Our proof will be complete if we can
show that this leads to a contradiction.
Rewrite  (t) = (   t)
h

 t   t g(t)1 G(t)
i
; then
0 (t) =

d
dt
  1


   t   t
g (t)
1 G (t)

+ (   t)
264 12 (t)
1  t
2   d

tg(t)
1 G(t)

dt
375 :
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But for any t^ 2 (0; 1) such that   t^ = 0;  
 t^   t^
g(t^)
1 G(t^)

= 0; and thus
0
 
t^

=      t^  t^ d

tg(t)
1 G(t)

dt

t=t^
 0
because d

g(t)
1 G(t)

=dt  0 by assumption (1). This is a contradiction.
By Lemma 1,
n (t) = 
o t

1  (1  )n
n
(10)
increases in t: That is, given n; the expected prot for the marginal entrant is higher if it
has a higher quality. It can also be veried that n (t) decreases in n: We next establish
that the expected post-entry prot for the marginal entrant is increasing in its quality:
Lemma 2 E (jt) increases in t:
Proof. First, we show that
lX
n=1
n (t) increases in t for l = 1; 2; :::; N: Integrating by parts,
we have
(N   1)!
(N   1  l)! (l   1)!
Z G(t)
0

N 1 l

(1  )l 1 d
=
(N   1)!
(N   l)! (l   1)!
Z G
0
(1  )l 1 d

N l

=
(N   1)!
(N   l)! (l   1)! (1 G)
l 1GN l +
(N   1)!
(N   l)! (l   2)!
Z G
0
N l (1  )l 2 d:
Repeatedly performing integration by parts for
R G
0 
N l (1  )l 2 d; R G0 N l+1 (1  )l 3 d;
and so on, we obtain:
(N   1)!
(N   1  l)! (l   1)!
Z G(t)
0

N 1 l

(1  )l 1 d
=
lX
n=1
(N   1)!
(n  1)! (N   n)! (1 G (t))
n 1G (t)N n =
lX
n=1
n (t) :
Since
R G(t)
0
 
N 1 l

(1  )l 1 d increases in G (t) ; which in turn increases in t;
lX
n=1
n (t)
increases in t:
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Then, for any t0 > t; recalling n (t0) > n (t) and n (t) decreases in n; we have
E
 
jt0  E (jt) = NX
n=1
n
 
t0

n
 
t0
  NX
n=1
n (t)n (t) >
NX
n=1

n
 
t0
  n (t)n (t)

NX
n=1

n
 
t0
  n (t)N (t) = " NX
n=1
n
 
t0
  NX
n=1
n (t)
#
N (t) > 0:
Hence, E (jt) increases in t:
Notice also that the marginal entrant will earn zero if it has i = 0; and will earn
o if it has i = 1: Therefore, for any given k 2 [0; o), there exists a unique threshold
tf  tf (k) 2 [0; 1) that satises
E (jtf ) = k; (11)
and tf = tf (k) increases in k; with tf = 0 for k = 0 and tf ! 1 as k ! o. We have
thus shown that there exists a symmetric equilibrium where each potential entrant will
enter if and only if its quality reaches the threshold tf ; and tf monotonically increases in k:
Moreover, it is straightforward to check that there can be no other symmetric equilibrium.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have:
Proposition 1 For any given k 2 (0; o) ; there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium
where: (i) potential entrant i; i = 1; 2; :::; N; will enter the market if and only if i  tf ,
with tf 2 (0; 1) ; dened in (11), being an increasing function of k, and each seller will
charge price po; (ii) each consumer will search sequentially in random order, purchase from
the rst match if u  po; and make no purchase if either she nds no match or u < po:
4. WELFARE ANALYSIS
In our model, the number of entrants (n) is uncertain, depending on the number of
potential entrants (N); the realizations of i; and entry cost (k): Hence a proper measure of
entry is the expected number of entrants, which is determined by t; the minimum possible
quality of actual entrants: A lower t corresponds to a higher expected number of sellers in
the market. In equilibrium, through the dependence of tf on k; the expected number of
sellers in turn will be determined by k.
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We are interested in two related questions on consumer and total welfare. First, how will
an exogenous change in entry conditions, such as entry cost, a¤ect welfare in the free entry
equilibrium? Second, given the entry conditions, how will the expected number of entrants
under free entry compare to those that maximize consumer or total welfare?
4.1 Consumer Welfare
For a given t; consumer welfare, measured by expected aggregate consumer surplus (net
of search cost), is
V =
NX
n=1
n (t)Vn (; p
o) ; (12)
where
n (t) =
 
N
n

[1 G (t)]nG (t)N n (13)
is the probability that exactly n sellers have entered, and
Vn (; p
o) =
nX
i=1
(1  )i 1 
Z 1
po
(u  po) f (u) du 
nX
i=1
(1  )i 1 is  (1  )n ns (14)
is the consumer welfare with n  1 sellers when their expected quality is . In Vn above,
the rst term is the (weighted) sum of benet when a consumer has searched and purchased
from the ith seller, while the second and the third terms are the expected search cost when
the consumer ends up with and without purchase, respectively. We dene:
 =
Z u
po
(u  po) f (u) du; M (t) = 1   [1 G (t)] ; (15)
where  is a consumers expected surplus from a match, andM (t) indicates the probability
that a potential entrant will not be a match when the entry threshold is t.
Lemma 3 Consumer welfare V  V (t) can be expressed as:
V =
h
1 M (t)N
i
  s


: (16)
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Proof. From (14), consumer surplus when n sellers are active is
Vn =

1  (1  )n



Z 1
po
(u  po) f (u) du 

1  (1  )n
2
  n (1  )
n


s  (1  )n ns
=

1  (1  )n

 

Z 1
po
(u  po) f (u) du  s

= [1  (1  )n]

  s


where we have used the fact that
nX
i=1
xi 1i = 1 x
n
(1 x)2  
nxn
1 x : Hence, from (12), consumer
welfare is
V =

  s

 NX
n=1
 
N
n

[1 G (t)]nG (t)N n  
NX
n=1
 
N
n

[1 G (t)]nG (t)N n (1  )n
!
=
n
1  [1   (1 G (t))]N
o
  s


=
h
1 M (t)N
i
  s


:
Equation (16) has an intuitive interpretation. The probability that a consumer will
(eventually) nd a match is 1  M (t)N . Since  is the expected surplus to a consumer
from a match and s= is the search cost adjusted by the expected match probability per
seller,    s reects the expected net benet from a search that yields a match. With a
unit mass of consumers, consumer welfare is the consumers expected net benet from the
entry of rms under threshold t.
Notice that given the distribution of u; search cost s; and the number of potential entrants
N; V is entirely determined by t through  =  (t) and M (t) : Totally di¤erentiating (16)
with respect to t and collecting terms yield
dV
dt
=  NM (t)N 1 (  s) g (t)| {z }
variety e¤ect
+
1

"
1 M (t)N

s+NM (t)N 1 (  s) (1 G (t))
#
d
dt| {z }
quality e¤ect
:
(17)
Thus, the impact of increased entry (i.e., a decrease in t) on consumer welfare can be
decomposed into two parts: a variety e¤ect and a quality e¤ect. Recall from (3) that
 > s; and hence more entry has a positive variety e¤ect: a decrease in t raises the expected
number of entrants, providing consumers with more search opportunities. However, from
(8), ddt > 0; and hence more entry has a negative quality e¤ect: a decrease in t reduces the
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average match probability of sellers in the market, lowering consumer search e¢ ciency. The
change in consumer welfare depends on the balance of these two opposing e¤ects. Since
tf (k) is monotonically increasing, a reduction in k has the same two e¤ects as a reduction
in tf in equilibrium:
Dene Vf  V (tf ) as the consumer welfare in the free-entry equilibrium. The following
result states that Vf in fact has an inverted-U relationship with entry cost: The proof rst
establishes that V (t) has an inverted-U shape, and then uses the fact that tf monotonically
increases in k.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, consumer welfare is an inverted-U function of entry cost k;
rst increasing and then decreasing, maximized at some k 2 (0; o) :
Proof. From (15) and by Lemma 1,
dM (t)
dt
=  d
dt
[1 G (t)] + g (t) = g (t) t: (18)
Noticing 11 G(t) =

1 M(t) ; we have
dV
dt
=
h
1 M (t)N
i s
2
d
dt
 NM (t)N 1 dM
dt

  s


=
h
1 M (t)N
i s
2

g (t)
1 G (t) (   t) NM (t)
N 1 g (t) t

  s


= g (t)
"
1 M (t)N
1 M (t)
s

(   t) NM (t)N 1 t

  s

#
: (19)
Therefore, for t 2 (0; 1) ; dVdt = 0 if
t

=
1
1 +NM (t)N 1 1 M(t)
1 M(t)N

 s
s
 : (20)
If t = 0; the LHS of (20) < the RHS of (20); if t! 1, the LHS of (20) > the RHS of (20).
Furthermore, from Lemma 1, the LHS of (20) monotonically increases in t: Since dM(t)dt  0;
d
dt  0; and
d

MN 1 1 M
1 MN

dM
=
MN 2
(1 MN )2
 
N  NM +MN   1 = MN 2
(1 MN )2 (1 M)
0@N   N 1X
j=0
M j
1A  0;
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the RHS of (20) decreases in t. Therefore, there exists a unique t 2 (0; 1) that solves (20),
with dVdt > 0 if t < t
 and dVdt < 0 if t > t
. Finally, since tf = t (k) is monotonically
increasing and dVfdk =
dVf
dtf
t0f (k) ; it follows that Vf rst increases and then decreases in k;
maximized at some k 2 (0; o).
As t; or entry cost k, decreases, more potential entrants choose to enter the market, but
the marginal entrant has a lower quality. Holding other things constant, an increase in
the number of sellers in the market is benecial to consumers (the variety e¤ect), because
more sellers increase the chance that the consumer will eventually nd a match; but the
addition of lower-quality sellers reduces the average seller quality, which harms consumers
because they expect to search more sellers before possibly nding a match (the quality
e¤ect). When k is high, the number of sellers is low. In this case, the positive variety e¤ect
from a decrease in k dominates, both because of the additional search opportunities and of
the relatively high qualities of the marginal entrants. However, when k is relatively low, a
further decrease in k attracts sellers with low qualities, while the benet from more search
opportunities is also small; consequently, the quality e¤ect dominates and consumer welfare
decreases.
Since the entry threshold associated with the maximum consumer welfare is t = tf (k) ;
Proposition 2 immediately implies that, from the consumer welfare perspective, free entry
is excessive under low entry cost but decient under high entry cost. Or, more precisely:
Corollary 1 Relative to what maximizes consumer welfare, the expected number of entrants
under free entry is too high when k < k and too low when k > k:
We also have the following result concerning the entry cost that maximizes consumer
welfare, k.
Corollary 2 k; or t; increases in search cost (s) and in the number of potential entrants
(N).
Proof. Since t = t (k) ; it su¢ ces to show that t increases in s and in N: Since LHS
of (20) increases in t and is independent of s while RHS decreases in t and increases in s,
14
t increases in s: Moreover, since M < 1; d

N lnM  MN + 1 =dM = NM  NMN 1 > 0;
and N ln 1  1N + 1 = 0; we have
d

NMN 1
1 M
1 MN

=dN =
MN 1
(1 MN )2 (1 M)
 
N lnM  MN + 1 < 0:
Therefore, t increases in N .
Thus, the entry cost (or the quality threshold) that maximizes consumer welfare increases
in search cost and in the number of potential entrants. Intuitively, with a high search cost,
it is more costly for consumers to search more varieties. It follows that fewer sellers with
higher quality tend to be better for consumers, and hence k (or t) is higher. Also, when
the number of potential sellers is high, the variety e¤ect is less signicant because for a given
k the expected number of entrants is large, and hence an increase in t tends to be more
benecial to consumers. Therefore, t also increases in the number of potential entrants.
4.2 Total Welfare
We next consider total welfare. For given k and t; the (expected) industry prot is
 =
NX
n=0
n (t)n [n ()  k] ; (21)
where n ()   k is the expected prot for a seller of quality  in a market with n sellers:
We have:
Lemma 4 For any given t; industry prot is
(t) = o
h
1 M (t)N
i
  kN [1 G (t)] ; (22)
and the free-entry equilibrium industry prot is
f =

1  tf

h
1 M (tf )N
i
o: (23)
Proof. Given that there are n sellers and each sellers expected match probability is , the
expected industry prot is
nn () = 
o [1  (1  )n] :
15
Then, from (21) and (13),
(t) = o
NX
n=0
n (t) [1  (1  )n]  k
NX
n=0
n (t)n
= o
(
1 
NX
n=0
N !
n! (N   n)! [1 G (t)]
nG (t)N n (1  )n
)
  kN [1 G (t)]
= o
h
1 M (t)N
i
  kN [1 G (t)] :
Moreover, from (11), under free-entry tf satises
k =
to

NX
n=1

N 1
n 1

[1 G (t)]n 1G (t)N n 1  (1  )
n
n
=
to

(
NX
n=1
(N   1)!
n! (N   n)! [1 G (t)]
n 1G (t)N n  
NX
n=1
(N   1)!
n! (N   n)! [1 G (t)]
n 1G (t)N n (1  )n
)
=
to

"
1 G (t)N
N [1 G (t)]  
M (t)N  G (t)N
N [1 G (t)]
#
=
t

o
"
1 M (t)N
N [1 G (t)]
#
:
Therefore, the free-entry equilibrium industry prot is
f =
NX
n=0
n (tf )n [n ()  k] = o
NX
n=1
n (tf ) [1  (1  )n] N [1 G (tf )] k
= o
h
1 M (tf )N
i
  tf

h
1 M (tf )N
i
o =

1  tf

h
1 M (tf )N
i
o:
Notice that
h
1 M (tf )N
i
o is the expected industry revenue when at least one sellers
product matches a consumers need. Since the marginal entrant with tf earns zero prot,
1  tf reects the expected prot margin of each entrant.
From (16) and (23), total welfare at the free entry equilibrium is
Wf =
h
1 M (tf )N
i 
  s


+

1  tf


o

: (24)
Proposition 3 In equilibrium: (i) industry prot decreases in k; (ii) social welfare de-
creases in k when s is su¢ ciently small or k is su¢ ciently high.
Proof. From (23) and (24), since k a¤ects f and Wf only through tf ; and since tf
increases in k; it su¢ ces to show that the stated relationships for k hold for tf : (i) Recall
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from (8) and (18) that d(t=)dt > 0 and
dM
dt  0: Thus
df
dtf
< 0: (ii) From Proposition 1,
consumer welfare decreases in t when t is high. Thus, since dfdtf < 0; Wf = Vf + f must
decrease in tf when tf is su¢ ciently high. Furthermore,
dWf
dtf
=  NM (tf )N 1 g (tf ) tf

  s


+

1  tf


o

+
h
1 M (tf )N
i s
2
d
dtf
  d (tf=)
dtf
o

:
Recall that
d(tf=)
dtf
> 0: Hence, dWfdtf < 0 if s! 0:
A marginal increase in entry cost raises tf ; which reduces the expected number of sellers,
and, hence, the probability of sales. Additionally, a higher entry cost reduces an inframar-
ginal sellers prot margin. Consequently, industry prot is reduced with a higher entry
cost. On total welfare, a higher k will increase consumer welfare by raising tf when k < k;
which can potentially outweigh the prot e¤ect. But when k is large, prot and consumer
welfare move in the same direction, and henceW is lower with an even higher k: Also, when
s is small, the low search cost can largely o¤set the reduction in sellersquality to provide
search incentives, so that the prot change will dominate and hence an increase in entry
cost will lower total welfare.
Example 1 below illustrates how the equilibrium consumer welfare, industry prot and
total welfare vary with entry cost k:
Example 1 Suppose that N = 3; s = 0:05; with i and u being uniformly distributed on
[0; 1] : Then, from (2) and (15),  = 1+t2 , M =
1+t2
2 ;  =
1
8 and 
o = 14 : From (6), tf solves
E (jt) = 148 t
 
4t2 + t4 + 7

= k: From (16), Vf = 1320 (5tf + 1) (1  tf )

4t2f + t
4
f + 7

; t =
0:497; and k = 0:083: Moreover, from (23), f = 132 (1  tf )2

4t2f + t
4
f + 7

; and thus
Wf =
1
320 (11  5tf ) (1  tf )

4t2f + t
4
f + 7

: In Figure 1, consumer welfare is the inverted-
U curve (solid curve), while both industry prot (dash curve) and total welfare (dot curve)
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decrease with k:
0.0 0.1 0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
k
welfare
Figure 1
Now consider the socially optimal t; denoted as to  to (k) ; for which we do not impose
the free-entry condition E (jt) = k: From (22) and (16), for any given t; total welfare is
given by
W (t) =

  s

+ o
h
1 M (t)N
i
  kN [1 G (t)] : (25)
Thus,
dW
dt
=
s
2
d
dt
h
1 M (t)N
i
 

  s

+ o

NM (t)N 1 tg (t) + kNg (t) : (26)
At the free entry equilibrium, since the marginal entrant has zero net prot due to
E (jtf ) = k; the marginal entrant must reduce industry prot due to the business-stealing
e¤ect. From Proposition 2, for tf < t  tf (k) ; free entry is excessive for consumer welfare.
Therefore, when k  k (or tf  t); free entry must be socially excessive, with to > tf .
When k > k; entry is decient for consumer welfare, but it can still be socially excessive
when the negative prot e¤ect is considered. However, when k is large, the prot e¤ect is
small relative to the e¤ect on consumers, and entry is socially decient, as we establish in
the result below.
Proposition 4 Free entry is socially excessive (i.e., to > tf ) when k  k; and it is socially
decient (i.e., to < tf ) when k is su¢ ciently large (but still smaller than o):
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Proof. We have already argued to > tf when k  k: It remains to show to < tf when k (<
o) is su¢ ciently large. From the proof of Lemma 4, any t  tf satises k  to
h
1 M(t)N
N [1 G(t)]
i
:
Substituting this into (26), we have
dW
dt

ttf

"
1 M (t)N
1 G (t)

s (   t)
2
+
t

o

 

  s

+ o

NM (t)N 1 t
#
g (t) :
Thus, when k ! o; t ! 1;  ! 1;M (t) ! 1 and, from (18), limt!1 1 M(t)
N
1 G(t) =
limt!1
 N M(t)N 1g(t)t
 g(t) = N: Hence, the right-hand side of the above inequality approaches
  (  s)Ng (1) < 0:
Therefore, when k is su¢ ciently large (but still smaller than o); dWdt

ttf < 0; so that free
entry is socially decient (i.e., to < tf ).
4.3 E¤ects of the Number of Potential Entrants (N)
Our proceeding analysis has assumed that the number of potential entrants, N; is given.
We now discuss the welfare e¤ects of N: Potentially, N can also be a¤ected by private
arrangements and government policies.
A change in N a¤ects V directly and also indirectly by impacting t: Holding t constant,
an increase in N increases V ; but the indirect e¤ect of N through t is more complicated,
partly because V is non-monotonic in t. While a general analysis of the e¤ects of N on
consumer and total welfare is beyond the scope of the paper, numerical analysis of several
examples suggest that consumer welfare monotonically increases in N when N is relatively
small; whereas industry prot and total welfare may rst increase and then decrease in N:
One example is below:
Example 2 Suppose that s = 0:05; with i and u being uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
Then, from (2) and (15),  = 1+t2 , M =
1+t2
2 ;  =
1
8 and 
o = 14 : From (11), the
equilibrium tf is determined by k =
tf
 
o 1 MN
N(1 tf) : Suppose further that k = 0:03: Then for
each N; we can compute tf and substitute tf into V; f and Wf : For N  10; Figure 2
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below illustrates the impact of N on consumer welfare (solid curve); industry prot (dash
curve); and total welfare (dot curve):
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
N
Welfare
Figure 2
While the relationships illustrated in Figure 2 are based on specic parameter values, they
are likely to hold in more general settings, for the following intuition. First, an increase in N
leads to more entrants for any given t; and hence to lower prots for the marginal entrant.
Thus tf increases in N: Second, holding other things constant, from (16), an increase in N
increases consumer welfare, V: Moreover, from Proposition 2, consumer welfare increases in
t if t is relatively small. It follows that when N is relatively small, consumer welfare tends
to increase in N; as in Figure 2: Third, a change in N also a¤ects  and W both directly
and indirectly through t: holding other things constant, an increase in N positively a¤ects
industry prot and thus total welfare; but the higher t due to a higher N may negatively
impact industry prot and total welfare (as in Figure 1): The direct e¤ect or the indirect
e¤ect can respectively dominate when N is relatively small or relatively large, as in Example
2.
We summarize the above discussion in the following:
Remark 1 An increase in the number of potential entrants can boost consumer welfare but
lower industry prot and total welfare.
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5. DIFFERENTIATION AMONG MATCHED SELLERS
So far, we have assumed that a consumer has the same value (u) from all of her matched
sellers, even though u is ex ante uncertain to the consumer. As we mentioned earlier, one
advantage of this formulation is that equilibrium price will then be invariant to the number
of sellers, which substantially simplies the analysis. We now consider an alternative setting
where a consumer has heterogeneous values for sellers who match her need. Specically,
as in Wolinsky (1986), we assume that a consumers value for each matched seller i, ui; is
independently drawn from distribution F on support [0; u] ; with density f:9 Thus, there
is horizontal di¤erentiation among matched sellers. Everything else is the same as in the
main model.
A key aspect in which this variant di¤ers from the main model is that entry will now also
a¤ect market price. Our analysis in this section proceeds as follows: First, we characterize
the equilibrium pricing strategy given the number of active sellers (n) and their average
quality (). Next, we show that the equilibrium market price (pn) decreases in . This
additional price e¤ect introduces a complication to the expected prot for a seller. In
particular, unlike in the main model, it is no longer clear that a potential entrants expected
prot will increase in t, because a higher t, which results in a higher average quality ; now
also leads to a lower equilibrium price. After presenting the equilibrium analysis for a given
n, we will turn to numerical analysis to show that the welfare results of the main model
still hold under additional functional and parameter restrictions.
Suppose rst that there are n  N sellers in the market. Following Weitzman (1979) and
Wolinsky (1986), consumersoptimal search strategy is to sample sellers sequentially, with
reservation value a () from matched seller i that satises
9That is, in contrast to our main model in which the values of a consumers matched sellers are perfectly
dependent, this formulation considers the other polar case where these values are independent. More realis-
tically, the values of a consumers matched sellers may be neither perfectly dependent nor independent; but,
like others in the literature, we focus on these two polar cases for analytical tractability.
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Z u
a
(ui   a) f (ui) dui = s: (27)
Note that the market is active only when sellers are expected to charge pn  a: A consumer
stops searching when she nds a match with ui  a; if no such product is found after
she searches all sellers, she buys the product from the matched seller with the highest
ui  pn; and she buys nothing if no match is found or if ui < pn for all matches. Since ui
is independently and identically distributed for each of a consumers matched sellers, for
convenience we shall drop the subscript i for the rest of the section.
Total di¤erentiation of (27) with respect to  and rearranging terms, we have
@a
@
=
R u
a (u  a) f (u) du

R u
a f (u) du
=
s
2 [1  F (a)] > 0: (28)
Hence, a increases with . In words, the benet of search is larger if the expected quality
of sellers is higher. We assume that s is su¢ ciently small such that consumers will indeed
search in equilibrium.
Next, we argue that there exists an equilibrium such that sellers charge the same price
despite di¤erences in match probabilities.10 If there is only one seller (n = 1); then it
optimally charges p1 = po: So suppose that n  2. If other sellers charge pn in equilibrium,
given the search strategy by consumers, a seller with i charges p to maximize
ni (p; pn) = p fi [1  F (p+ a  pn)]'n + iRn (p; pn)g ; (29)
where
'n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
jX
h=0

j
h

(1  )h [F (a)]j h = 1  [1   + F (a)]
n
n [1  F (a)] (30)
is the number of consumers who come to seller i for the rst time after sampling j 2
10 Intuitively, all matched sellers of a consumer are horizontally di¤erentiated as in Wolinsky (1986), and
thus the equilibrium has a similar structure.
22
f0; 1; :::; n  1g other sellers and nding no match or the valuation is below a, and
Rn (p; pn) =
Z p+a pn
p
24n 1X
j=0

n 1
j

(1  )n 1 j [F (u  p+ pn)]j
35 f (u) du (31)
=
Z p+a pn
p
[1   + F (u  p+ pn)]n 1 f (u) du
is the number of returning consumers who have sampled all sellers and have not found any
value above a; while seller i is a match that gives the highest valuation. It follows that
Rn (pn; pn) =
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du: (32)
From the rst-order condition of (29), at an equilibrium with pi = pn for all i = 1; :::; n; the
equilibrium pn satises 0ni  @ni@p jp=pn = 0:
[1  F (a)]'n+
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 dF (u) pnff (a)'n 
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 df (u)g = 0:
(33)
If pn = 0; the LHS of (33) is positive. If pn = a; the LHS of (33) becomes f[1  F (a)]  af (a)g'n;
which is negative because a  1 F (a)f(a) > p1   1 F (p1)f(p1) = 0; where the inequality holds due to
p1 < a and
1 F (a)
f(a) <
1 F (p1)
f(p1)
: Thus there exists some pn 2 (0; a) that solves (33), and pn is
given by
pn =
[1  F (a)]'n +
R a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du
f (a)'n  
R a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f 0 (u) du : (34)
This is also the unique symmetric price equilibrium with consumer search, as we establish
below.11 The proof basically involves showing that ni (pn; pn) is strictly concave in pn;
which relies on the monotonic hazard rate condition (1).
Lemma 5 For the alternative model where each consumers value is independent for every
match, when there are n sellers whose expected match probability is , there exists a unique
symmetric price equilibrium with consumer search, where each seller sets pn and consumers
search with reservation value a () that satises (27).
11Search models generally also have a trivial equilibrium where rms are expected to and indeed charge
very high prices, and no consumer engages in search. As in the literature, we do not consider such trivial
cases.
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Proof. It su¢ ces to show that the symmetric price equilibrium, dened by (34), is unique,
which would be the case if ni (pn; pn) is a strictly concave function of pn, or
00ni =   [1   + F (pn)]n 1

f (pn) + pnf
0 (pn)
 ff (a)'n Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f 0 (u) dug
is negative. First, from (30), 'n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
[1   + F (a)]j  [1   + F (a)]n 1 : Hence
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f 0 (u) du
 [1   + F (a)]n 1
Z a
pn
f 0 (u) du = [1   + F (a)]n 1 [f (a)  f (pn)]  f (a)'n:
Therefore, 00ni < 0 if f (pn) + pnf
0 (pn)  0: When f 0  0; clearly 00ni < 0:
Next, suppose f 0 < 0: Notice that d [f (u) = (1  F (u))] =du  0 implies f 0 1 Ff + f  0:
Thus, if 1 F (pn)f(pn)  pn; we have f (pn) + pnf 0 (pn)  f (pn) +
1 F (pn)
f(pn)
f 0 (pn)  0; and hence
00ni < 0: Finally, we prove that f (pn) + pnf
0 (pn)  0 if 1 F (pn)f(pn) < pn: Suppose, to the
contrary, that f (pn) + pnf 0 (pn) < 0. Then f (pn) <  pnf 0 (pn) : It follows from (33) that
[1  F (a)]  pnf (a) > 0; which implies pn < 1 F (a)f(a)  1 F (pn)f(pn) ; a contradiction.
We next state a result on the relationship between equilibrium price and the average
quality of sellers in the market.
Proposition 5 For the alternative model where each consumers value is independent for
every match: (i) given the number of sellers (n), an increase in  leads to a decrease in pn;
(ii) given , an increase in n leads to a decrease in pn.
Proof. (i) From (33), since @@ > 0 and 
00
ni < 0;
dpn
d
=  
@0ni
@ +
@0ni
@a
@
@
00ni
< 0 if
@0ni
@
< 0 and
@0ni
@a
< 0:
First, 0ni in (33) can be rewritten as
0ni = [1  F (a)]'n +
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 dF (u)  pn

f (a)'n  
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 df (u)

= [1  F (a)  pnf (a)]'n +
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) + pnf 0 (u) du:
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From (30), 'n =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
[1   + F (a)]j : Hence, @'n@ < 0 and thus
@0ni
@ < 0:
Second, substituting 'n from (30), we have
[1  F (a)]'n +
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du
= [1  F (a)] 1  [1   + F (a)]
n
n [1  F (a)] +
1
n
f[1   + F (a)]n   [1   + F (pn)]ng
=
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
: (35)
Thus, Letting x  1   + F (a) ; we have
0ni =
1  [1   (1  F (pn))]n
n
 pn

f (a) (1  xn)
n [1  F (a)]   
Z a
pn
[1   (1  F (u))]n 1 df (u)

;

pn
@0ni
@a
= [1   + F (a)]n 1 f (a) f (a)
1  F (a)  
1
n
[1  [1   + F (a)]n]
d

f(a)
1 F (a)

da
+ [1   + F (a)]n 1 f 0 (a)
=
1
n
(
nxn 1
f (a)2 + f 0 (a) [1  F (a)]
1  F (a)  
1  xn
1  F (a)
f 0 (a) [1  F (a)] + f2 (a)
[1  F (a)]
)
=
1
n
f 0 (a) [1  F (a)] + f2 (a)
1  F (a)

nxn 1   1  x
n
1  F (a)

=
1
n
f 0 (a) [1  F (a)] + f2 (a)
1  F (a)

nxn 1    1  x
n
1  x

=

n
f 0 (a) [1  F (a)] + f2 (a)
1  F (a)

nxn 1   1  x
n
1  x

< 0 for x 2 (0; 1)
since 1 x
n
1 x =
n 1X
j=0
xj > nxn 1 for x 2 (0; 1) : Hence, @0ni@a < 0:
(ii) Since 00ni < 0 and
dpn
dn
=  
@0ni
@n
00ni
;
pn decreases in n if 0ni decreases in n. From (33),
0ni = [1  F (a)  pnf (a)]'n +
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) + f 0 (u) pn du:
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Hence, 0ni decreases in n if 'n decreases in n; which is indeed the case because, from (30)
and recalling x = 1   + F (a) 2 (0; 1) ;
'n   'n+1 =
1
n
n 1X
j=0
xj   1
n+ 1
nX
j=0
xj =
1
n+ 1
0@ 1
n
n 1X
j=0
xj   xn
1A > 0:
It may seem surprising that a higher average quality would lead to a lower market price,
but in a search market this result is quite natural, for the following reason. An increase in
the average quality of sellers in the market induces a higher consumer reservation value in
their search decision, because the expected benet from another search is higher. This forces
sellers to lower prices in order to induce consumers to purchase without further search.
We next show that, for a given entry cost, there exists a free-entry equilibrium that is
similar to the one in the main model, with the marginal entrants quality, tf ; now dened
by (36) below.
Proposition 6 For the alternative model where each consumers value is independent for
every match, and for any k 2 (0; o) ; there exists an equilibrium where: (i) potential entrant
i will enter the market if and only if i  tf , each entrant will charge pn as in (34) when
there are n entrants, and tf satises
NX
n=1
n (tf ) tfpn
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
= k; (36)
(ii) consumers will search sequentially with reservation value a that satises (27):
Proof. For a given t and thus ; from (29) and (35), in the symmetric equilibrium with n
sellers the prot for seller i is
ni = pn

i [1  F (a)]
1  [1   + F (a)]n
n [1  F (a)] + i
Z a
pn
[1   + F (u)]n 1 f (u) du

= ipn
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
:
Thus, the expected post-entry prot for entrant i is E (ji) =
NX
n=1
n (t)ni; which increases
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in i: For the seller with match probability t; its expected prot from entry is
E (jt) =
NX
n=1
n (t) tpn
1  [1   + F (pn)]n
n
;
which is a continuous function of t: Since the marginal entrant with t = 0 has zero prot,
and the marginal entrant with t = 1 has prot o; for any k 2 (0; o) ; E (j0) < k and
E (j1) > k: Therefore, there exists some tf 2 [0; 1) such that E (jtf ) = k: That is, given
k; there exists some tf such that potential entrants with i  tf will enter. Finally, from
Proposition 5, the pricing strategy and consumer search behavior are optimal when there
are n sellers.
Di¤erent from the main model, here we have not proven that tf is an increasing function
of k: The di¢ culty is that, as t increases, equilibrium price decreases and thus the impact
on the expected prot of the marginal seller with quality t is unclear.12 For the rest of this
section, we assume that (i) N = 2 and (ii) F and G are both uniform distributions on [0; 1] :
Then, it can be veried numerically that tf increases in k for various values of s: Fur-
thermore, consumer welfare initially increases but eventually decreases in t: The intuition is
similar as in the main model: a lower tf leads to a higher expected number of sellers in the
market but to a lower sellersaverage quality. The increase in variety benets consumers
by expanding their search opportunities, whereas the decrease in quality harms consumers
by reducing their search e¢ ciency. However, here price is also a¤ected, in two opposing
directions: greater variety acts to reduce equilibrium prices, whereas lower quality works in
the opposite direction as consumers search less due to the lower search benet. Neverthe-
less, as in the main model, when tf is high, and thus the number of active sellers is low, the
variety e¤ect tends to dominate, so that a further increase in tf results in lower consumer
welfare. On the other hand, when tf is low, the quality e¤ect tends to dominate, so that
an increase in tf results in higher consumer welfare.
Since tf increases in k; it follows that consumer welfare also rst increases and then
decreases in k: Given s; let k be the entry cost that maximizes consumer welfare: Then,
when k  k; same as in the main model, entry is excessive for both consumer and total
12Recall that in the main model, equilibrium price is independent of :
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welfare; whereas when k > k; entry is decient for consumer welfare, and possibly also for
total welfare:
Therefore, under additional functional and parameter restrictions, the results of our main
model continue to hold in this alternative setting.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In parallel to how free entry may lead to social ine¢ ciency when rms possess market
power, this paper has shown that unfettered entry can be detrimental to consumers when
they have imperfect information about sellers quality. In a model of consumer search
with vertical and horizontal product di¤erentiation, we nd that there exists an inverted-U
relationship between consumer welfare and entry cost (or the expected number of entrants):
Free entry is excessive for both consumer and total welfare when entry cost is relatively low.
It is also noteworthy that, in search markets, a decrease in average product quality can raise
market price.
Our analysis is reminiscent of Akerlof (1970)s classic model of the used-car market, where,
under adverse selection, low-quality sellers drive out high-quality sellers, and the market
may shut down completely. One may view our paper as taking Akerlofs model a step
further by adding consumer search to it, so that a buyer can incur a search cost to nd out,
possibly with some probability (and with the help of an expert such as an auto mechanic),
whether a car has a defect.13 A high-quality seller, whose car is less likely to be defective,
then has a higher probability to succeed in trading, and hence may have more incentive
to incur the (entry) cost to list its car for sale. The buyersability to potentially detect
a cars aw through costly search may thus mitigate the adverse selection problem. But
if entry cost is very low, it will not prevent low-quality sellers from entering the market;
search e¢ ciency for the buyers will then be too low and the market is likely to perform
poorly. On the other hand, if entry cost is too high, very few sellers will enter the market,
13This, together with the consumers idiosyncratic taste, may then determine whether the car will meet
her need.
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and even if their expected quality is high, it will be hard for buyers with heterogeneous
preferences to nd a match under the very limited search opportunities. This, in essence, is
the trade-o¤ between the variety and quality e¤ects of entry in search markets, as uncovered
in our paper. It should thus be clear that, while our model is specic and highly stylized,
its basic insights can be valid in more general settings and with alternative formulations of
the market environment.
To illustrate our idea most transparently, we have abstracted from various market insti-
tutions that respond to the information problem and potentially improve the variety vs.
quality trade-o¤. For example, rms may engage in costly advertising to convey quality
information to consumers. While advertising cost has often been viewed as a barrier to
competition, it may actually boost consumer welfare by deterring the entry of low-quality
rms. Also, market intermediaries can simultaneously lower the number of entrants and
raise their average quality. Various accreditation agencies can serve this purpose, as, for
instance, the accreditation of business schools could potentially help applicants search for
the right MBA programs. An Internet platform may prominently display sellers who are
more likely to meet consumersneeds, based on either organic search results or paid place-
ment, as is done by the three largest search engines (Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft Bing).
This can enhance consumer search e¢ ciency, but also raises entry hurdles for less relevant
sellers. Moreover, the organization of rms may also be motivated by such considerations.
For instance, a hotel chain under a brand name may impose certain quality standards on
its member hotels, and a merger between two rms might enable the merged rm to o¤er
products that better meet consumer needs, both of which could help consumer search. To
the extent that antirust and regulation can inuence these business practices, it would be
important for policy makers to recognize their benecial roles.
Policies may also impact welfare directly by either facilitating or impeding entry. How-
ever, since it is unlikely that a policy maker will know the precise entry cost or entry scale
that would be optimal for consumers, it is not obvious that government intervention would
improve market outcomes, especially given the institutional arrangements that the market
itself can make, as discussed above. Nevertheless, policies such as a minimum safety stan-
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dard or the truth-in-advertising regulation will likely improve search e¢ ciency and benet
consumers.
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